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Abstract: 
 
This paper argues that immigration can help to alleviate the burden ageing presents for 
the welfare states of most Western Economies. We develop a macroeconomic framework 
which deals with the impact of both ageing and immigration on economic growth. This is 
combined with a detailed model of the labour market, to include the interaction with low-
skilled unemployment. The empirical relevance of some crucial model assumptions is 
shown to hold for the Netherlands, 1973 – 2009, using a vector-error-correction model. 
The conclusions from the analysis of transitory and permanent shocks are that 
immigration will help to alleviate the ageing problem in the long run, as long as the 
immigrants will be able to participate in the labour force at least as much as the native 
population. Moreover, the better educated the immigrants are or become, the higher their 
contribution to growth will be. 
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1. Introduction 
Various studies have argued that immigration can contribute to solve a lack of labour 
supply that results from an ageing population – EU (2005), Freeman (2006). This notion 
also underlies the recent EU immigration policy, which includes the introduction of the 
‘blue card’ to attract highly skilled workers mid-2011 (for a critical discussion see Parkes 
and Angenendt, 2010). Apart from this group of highly skilled migrants, also the 
admission and procedures for seasonal workers, paid trainees and intra-corporate 
transferees is becoming more and more regulated (see Koehler cs. 2010 for an overview 
of recent measures).  
 In this paper we investigate, using both a theoretical model and empirical 
analysis, under which conditions immigration does help to compensate a lack of labour 
supply that results from an ageing population. It is obvious that immigration alone cannot 
account for keeping our GDP at a high level, and we also need other measures like a 
rising rate of labour force participation, particularly in the older age classes (Münz, 
2009). Therefore we include the ratio of the working age population to the total 
population in both our theoretical and empirical analysis. With respect to the empirical 
analysis we simply take the case of the Netherlands to illustrate our theoretical reasoning 
of how immigration can alleviate the ageing problem. In that context it is interesting to 
note that in the Netherlands there are many concerns among citizens, politicians and the 
CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis – an official independent research 
institute informing the Dutch government – on more liberal immigration policies (see e.g. 
Muysken et al. 2008). 
 Although the blue card seems to be a good instrument to attract more highly- 
educated individuals, we show that it may be beneficial to attract also immigrants who 
are not graduated from universities, as long as the skill distribution of the immigrants is 
on average not less favourable than that of the other labour market entrants. It is, 
however, very important that immigrants are in paid employment. We show that the 
benefits from immigration could proliferate further if policy makers focus successfully on 
an increase of the ratio of the working to the inactive population in general, which 
requires a better integration policy than in the past. The aim of our theoretical and 
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empirical analysis is to illustrate the relevance of this ratio, in particular in relation to net-
immigration. 
   Most of the literature on the impact of immigration on ageing focuses on the impact of 
immigration on the labour market and the welfare state with an emphasis on the short run 
– see Nannestad (2007) for an overview. A drawback of this focus then is that the impact 
of ageing and immigration on capital formation and economic growth usually are 
ignored. Razin and Sadka (1999, 2000) were the first who analysed the impact of 
immigration on ageing in a general equilibrium long-run context, taking this impact into 
account. They use a closed economy model, however. Moreover, in the tradition of long-
run-focused general equilibrium analysis they model the labour market in a highly 
stylised way, assuming full employment. But for the typical European welfare state the 
interaction between immigration, unemployment and ageing problems cannot be ignored. 
We therefore start our analysis by developing a model of the labour market which enables 
us to analyse the interaction between immigration, unemployment and ageing problems. 
We also include internationally mobile capital as a production factor, to facilitate the link 
with economic growth. 
Capital is modeled to be substitutable with high-skilled labour in a nested CES-
production structure, where the other component is low-skilled labour. This also allows 
for more flexibility in the substitution between high and low skilled labour compared to 
the Cobb-Douglas production function which is usually assumed in this type of analysis 
(Kemnitz, 2003; Krieger, 2004; Boeri and Brücker, 2005; Brücker and Jahn, 2011).2 
Moreover, instead of the usual simple monopoly union model, we assume right-to-
manage wage bargaining. 
We include the long-run properties of the labour market model in our concise long-
run macroeconomic model as a background for our analysis of the impact of immigration 
as a remedy to ageing and capital formation in Western economies. The properties of that 
model are in line with the model of Razin and Sadka – although we have extended the 
model to an open economy. Moreover, our model is flexible enough to allow for the 
inclusion of unemployment. Finally, an attractive feature of our macroeconomic model is 
                                                 
2 Brücker and Jahn (2011) do allow for more flexibility in the substitution between high and low skilled 
labour, but capital is still included in a Cobb-Douglas framework. 
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that it pays explicit attention to the importance of social equilibrium and the role of the 
welfare state. 
Since we use capital as a production factor, we can also use the insights of our 
macroeconomic model to discuss the interaction between economic growth, the labour 
market and the welfare state. Several interesting insights result from our analysis, which 
lead beyond the insights of using a Razin and Sadka type general equilibrium model or a 
labour market model separately. For instance we analyse simultaneously the impact of 
immigration on economic growth, while taking into account the interaction with both 
unemployment and ageing. 
   The set up of our paper is as follows. We present some stylised facts for the 
Netherlands in section 2, which also introduces the data we use in our empirical analysis. 
We then develop a model of the labour market in section 3 and incorporate the long-run 
features of that model in a macroeconomic theoretical model in section 4. Using the 
macroeconomic model we analyse the impact of immigration on welfare state and ageing 
problems. We argue that an important element is the extent to which immigration has a 
positive effect on the activity rate. For that reason we investigate empirically in section 5 
to which extent such an effect could be found for the Netherlands, together with other 
predicted effects from our analysis using a vector-error-correction model. We find that 
the implications of our theoretical model can be corroborated for the Netherlands. Since 
we find a positive effect of immigration on the activity rate only for the first ten years 
after immigration, we conclude that for the Netherlands immigration can be used to 
alleviate the ageing problem if the integration and participation of immigrants in the 
labour market is improved. We elaborate and generalise this notion in our concluding 
remarks in section 6. 
 
 
2.     Stylised facts for the Netherlands, 1970 – 20093 
Population growth has been very low in the Netherlands, falling from 1.4% in 1960 to 
0.4% in 1980 and fluctuating around that level thereafter. As a consequence of ageing, 
the share of population 65+ increased from less than 9 % of total population in 1960 to 
                                                 
3 A more elaborate discussion is presented in Muysken and Ziesemer (2011b). The data sources are 
presented in Appendix I. 
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over 15 % in 2009, and it is predicted to increase till 25% in 2050. This has enormous 
implications for the sustainability of the welfare state. The two key challenges due to 
ageing are summarized by the OECD (2008, pp. 37 ff.) as follows: (1) returning public 
finances to a sustainable path, mainly in response to increasing care expenditures and 
pension benefits which have to be borne by a decreasing share of the population, and (2) 
compensating for labour market shortages due to a declining work force relative to the 
population by increasing labour market participation. With respect to the latter the OECD 
pays special attention to immigration, which has “traditionally been an important source 
of labour supply.”(p. 43).4  
 
Figure 1 Immigration and emigration, 1970 -2009 
 
 
From Figure 1 one sees that immigration fluctuates around 0.7% of population – this is 
higher than the average population growth of 0.4% mentioned above, which highlights 
the important role of immigration in population growth. From the figure one also sees 
that emigration is increasing somewhat, but net immigration is usually positive around 
0.15% of population. 
                                                 
4 However, the OECD recognises that the labour market performance of immigrants in the past decades has 
been poor and recommends various policy measures to improve labour market integration of immigrants 
(OECD, 2008, Ch. 5).  
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With respect to the characteristics of immigrants, the educational composition of the non-
native population is summarised in Table 1. This shows that the immigrant population on 
average reflects quite well the native population in terms of education – not surprising the  
 “non-western” part of the non-native population has a higher incidence of low education. 
Kim, Levine and Lotti (2010) show that the educational similarity of immigrants also 
holds for the EU15.5 
 
Table 1 Educational composition of labour force, 2001 -2009 (average shares) 
 Share in labour force 
Native Non-Native 
Level of 
education 
Low 0,25 0,30 
Medium 0,45 0,41 
High 0,30 0,28 
 
 
With respect to macroeconomic characteristics, three features deserve special attention 
since we will refer to these features in our macroeconomic model later:  
First the Dutch economy is characterised by persistent excess of domestic savings 
over investment, consistent with a persistent surplus on the current account. The savings 
ratio relative to national income is relatively constant over time: It fluctuates around 25 
per cent – see Figure 2. The investment ratio shows a slight tendency to decline, after a 
marked drop in the early 1970s. 
   A second feature is the stability of the wage share in GDP. After the turbulence 
following the oil-crises in the early 1970s, the share remained almost constant around 60 
per cent, although a slight decrease over time can be discerned – see also Figure 2. The 
third feature which deserves attention is the observation that the strong increase in 
unemployment which occurred in the 1970s and early 1980s, and its secular decrease 
thereafter, is not reflected in the development of immigration, as can be seen from Figure 
3.   
                                                 
5 Table 1 includes the impact of net migration, since skill biased emigration would affect the skill structure 
of natives. Emigrants in the Netherlands are on average somewhat higher educated than natives (van Dalen 
and Henkens, 2011). 
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Figure 2 Savings, investment and wage costs (%GDP), 1970 -2009 
 
 
Both unemployment and immigration show clear cyclical fluctuations, as one might 
expect in opposite directions. However, the causality does not necessary run from 
immigration to unemployment, as is often presumed in the popular debate – see also Jean 
and Jiménez (2011) who make this point for OECD countries. Actually the reversed 
causality may be present in the data for the Netherlands. If that would be the case, we 
interpret this as a policy reaction function of immigration authorities. 
   The above observations corroborate the following stylised facts in our analysis: 
(1) a consistently ageing population 
(2) positive net immigration, with an education quite similar to that of the native 
population (but 5% more low skilled) 
(3) a constant propensity to consume 
(4) a constant ratio of labour income to GDP since the end of the 1980s. 
(5) a persistent current account surplus, reflecting excess domestic savings 
(6) no relationship between unemployment and immigration until 1980 and a 
countercyclical negative relation since 1980.These stylised facts will also appear 
in the model we develop below. 
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Figure 3 Unemployment and immigration, 1979 - 2009 
 
 
 
3. A model of the labour market 
As we mentioned in the introduction, models analysing economic growth usually ignore 
unemployment. However, when we look at the interaction between immigration and 
ageing in the context of the welfare state, unemployment should play a role. For that 
reason we first present a model of the labour market with wage bargaining, which allows 
for unemployment to occur. The long run properties of this model then will be included 
in a long run growth model which we develop in the next section. 
 To allow for capital accumulation as a source of economic growth, we distinguish 
physical capital as a separate production factor next to low and high skilled labour. We 
also allow for more flexibility in the substitution between high and low skilled labour by 
using a two-level CES-production function. Moreover, instead of a monopoly union 
model, we assume right-to-manage wage bargaining. 
 Our analysis proceeds as follows: We first present the production structure and 
firm behaviour. The process of wage formation and unemployment is analysed 
subsequently. Finally we derive some long run properties of our model, which we use in 
the macroeconomic model of the next section.  
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Unemployment
Immigration
Im
m
ig
ra
tio
n 
pe
r 1
00
0 
po
pu
la
tio
n
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t %
 la
bo
ur
 fo
rc
e
     9
 
3.1. The production structure and firm behaviour 
To allow for a reasonale flexibility, while still analytically manageable, we use a two-
level CES-production function.6 That is, output Y is produced according to a nested CES-
production function allowing for the widely observed capital-skill complementarity:  
ܻ ൌ ൤ሺߣܮሻିఘ ൅ ൣሺ߲ܪሻିథ ൅  ሺߡܭሻିథ൧
ഐ
ഝ ൨
ିభഐ
  ߪ ൌ ଵଵାఘ ൒ 0    (1) 
H and L represent employment of high-skilled and low-skilled workers, respectively, and 
K is capital. The parameters λ, ∂ and ι are productivity parameters. Low-skilled labour 
has a constant elasticity of substitution σ with capital and high-skilled labour. The latter 
form a complex F with a constant elasticity of substitution, ς:  
ܨሺܪ, ܭሻ ൌ ൣሺ߲ܪሻିథ ൅  ሺߡܭሻିథ൧ି
భ
ഝ   ߫ ൌ ଵଵାథ ൒ 0    (2) 
When ς = 0, capital and high-skilled labour are complements, as is sometimes assumed in 
the literature.7  
This formulation of the production structure is much more general than Razin and 
Sadka (2000), who assume perfect substitutability between low and high-skilled labour, 
and Kemnitz (2003), who assumes the elasticity of subtitution to be unity (σ = 1) since he 
uses a Cobb-Douglas production function.8 Many studies find capital-skill 
complementarity, which is associated with ς < 1, and substitutability between high and 
low skilled labour, with σ > 1. See, for instance, Ben-Gad (2008) and Papageorgiou and 
Saam (2008). We will use these restrictions in our analysis. 
Profit maximisation by the firm implies that marginal productivities should equal 
factor prices. Hence, when the low-skilled wage is wL, the high-skilled wage is wH and 
the interest rate is r, we find: 
1
11
.L
Y Yw
L L
                 (3a) 
                                                 
6 Papageorgiou and Saam (2008: 120) note: “More recently, there is a revived interest in [this function] … 
Its flexibility, coming from the substitution parameters and an additional input, makes it an attractive 
choice for many applications in economic theory and empirics.” 
7 Kemnitz (2003) uses this assumption to ignore capital in his analysis. 
8 The Cobb-Douglas production function is also used in Casarico and Devillanova (2003) and Krieger 
(2004) – and in more encompassing, applied models like Boeri and Brücker (2005) and Brücker and Jahn 
(2011). 
     10
1 111
. .H
Y Y Fw
H F H
                      (3b) 
ݎ ൅ ߜ ൑ డ௒డ௄ ൌ ቂ
௒
ிቃ
భ
഑ . ιଵି
భ
അ . ቂி௄ቃ
భ
അ        (3c) 
 
The workforce consists of NH and NL high-skilled and low-skilled persons, respectively. 
Labour supply is exogenous – for an extension to endogenous labour supply see Krieger 
(2004). 
 
3.2. Wage bargaining and social equilibrium in the presence of unemployment 
 The high-skilled labour market is competitive, which implies that the wage rate wH is 
determined by full employment for all high-skilled persons.9 The marginal productivity 
condition for capital holds with equality at some value denoted K* and with inequality in 
case of a capital constraint for K൏K* (see below). 
For low-skilled workers the wage is determined by union bargaining, where the 
unions take both the employment of high-skilled workers, which follows from labour 
supply, and the capital stock as given. We assume a right-to-manage model, where the 
bargaining power by unions equals ε – this encompasses Kemnitz’ (2003)  monopoly 
union model by setting ε = 1, and Razin and Sadka’s (2000) full competition when ε = 0. 
Denoting the level of unemployment benefits by b and assuming a tax rate tu, the 
expected income of a low-skilled worker is (1 – u).tu.wL + u.b, where u is the low-skilled 
unemployment rate, u = (NL – L)/NL. The firm negotiates with the unions about the wage, 
given its capital stock and employment of high skilled workers.  
Social equilibrium requires that the employed pay taxes at a rate tu to finance their 
unemployed colleagues. We assume a pay-as-you-go system where government sets the 
tax and benefit rates such that unemployment benefits are covered by tax revenues. Since 
we focus on low-skilled unemployment, we assume that the benefits are paid by taxes on 
                                                 
9 This is also assumed in Kemnitz (2003). It is relatively easy to extend the model for separate wage 
bargaining of high-skilled workers, see Boeri and Brücker (2005) and Brücker and Jahn (2011) for an ad 
hoc application in a similar model of the labour market. 
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the low-skilled wage only.10 While Kemnitz (2003) assumes that the tax rate tu is 
determined a priori by government and benefits follow endogenously, we assume in line 
with the approach more commonly used in the literature – e.g. for instance Boeri and 
Brücker (2005) –that government sets a replacement rate β with respect to the net wage, 
and then the tax rate follows.  
When setting the replacement rate at β, we find that the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment u* is given by (see Muysken and Ziesemer, 2011b, reproduced in 
Appendix 2):  
 
1 . . [1 . .( 1)].[ ' .( 1)]* 1
1 (1 ). '.
u with          
            (4) 
We find the familiar result that equilibrium unemployment is higher the larger the 
replacement rate – see for instance Boeri and Brücker (2005).11 Similarly, a higher union 
power ε also leads to a higher rate of unemployment, while an increase in low-skilled 
labour augmenting technological productivity, i.e. a higher value of λ, would lead to a 
lower rate of unemployment. Finally, an important observation is that from the analysis 
above it follows that the equilibrium unemployment rate of low-skilled workers, u*, is 
not affected by the supply of low skilled workers.  
   Using equation (4), the aggregate rate of unemployment, utot, is given by: 
(1 *).1 *L H Ltot
L H L H
u N N Nu u
N N N N
           (5) 
One sees that when the number of available low-skilled workers increases relative to the 
number of high-skilled ones, the aggregate rate of unemployment increases. However, 
when both numbers increase proportionally, the aggregate rate of unemployment is 
unaffected. The latter is consistent with stylised fact (6) from section 2, which shows that 
there is no secular relationship between unemployment and immigrants. Here one should 
also take into account stylised fact (2) that immigration is roughly speaking skill neutral. 
                                                 
10 This assumption, which is in line with Kemnitz (2003), is motivated by analytical tractability. Including 
benefits paid by high skilled workers complicates the analysis considerably, without altering the qualitative 
results. 
11 
11
'    > 0 ; ν > 0 is a constant. A necessary and sufficient condition for positive unemployment is 
[1 . .(1 )].[ ' .(1 )] / .            . 
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 A final observation is that since L = (1 – u*).NL, we know from equation (3a) that 
the low skilled wage decreases when the supply of low-skilled workers increases. This is 
an important result since a popular perception is that most immigrant workers are 
unskilled and therefore immigration leads to a lower wage for unskilled workers. 
However, apart from the bias in this perception – see stylised fact (2) – , this result does 
only hold unambiguously in the short run, when the capital stock and skilled labour, H, 
are given. In the next section we analyse the interaction of changes in labour supply with 
the capital stock. 
 
3.3. Long-run equilibrium in the labour market 
To model economic growth we assume skill-neutral labour augmenting technological 
progress at a rate a, i.e. both λ and ∂ grow at that rate, while ι is a constant. Moreover, the 
labour force grows in a skill neutral way at a rate n, i.e. both NL and NH grow at that rate. 
These assumptions are not only motivated by analytical convenience, but also by our aim 
to show the impact of skill neutral immigration – which is consistent with stylized fact 
(2) – on economic growth.  
The share of total labour income in GDP, α, is implicitly given by: 
1 1 11 11
1 1 11
[ .(1 *). ] [ . ] . ( ; )
1
[ . ] . ( ; )
L H H
H
u N N F K N
K F K N
  
  

 
 
 
        (6) 
which is a function of the capital stock. Since we assume σ > 1 and ς < 1, we find that α 
increases with NL and decreases with NH, given K. However, α does not change when NL, 
NH and given K change with an equal proportion. We will use this relationship in our 
further analysis. It seems also consistent with stylised fact (4) from section 2, which 
shows that the ratio of labour income to GDP is constant over time. 
The firm follows equation (3c) when determining its desired capital stock, given 
the world interest rate which is set at an exogenous level, r*. Then the equilibrium capital 
stock, K*, can be solved by substitution of equation (1) in (3c) at equilibrium levels of 
employment, which yields: 
1 െ ߙ ൌ ሺ௥כାఋሻ௄
ቈሺఒሺଵି௨כሻேಽሻషഐାൣሺడேಹሻషഝା ሺఐ௄ሻషഝ൧
ഐ
ഝ ቉
షభഐ
        (7) 
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Combining equations (6) and (7) then solves the equilibrium capital stock K* as a linear 
homogenous function f of NL and NH :12 
 
K* = f(λ.NL, ∂.NH; r*+ δ ,u*)  f’1, f’2 > 0     (8) 
 
The equilibrium capital stock K* increases through changes in net capital inflows when NL 
or NH increase, and it increases proportionally with NL and NH, when these grow at the 
same rate. A lower interest rate or a lower rate of low-skilled unemployment will lead to 
a higher equilibrium capital stock.  
 Because the constancy of the left-hand side of (3c) requires equal growth rates for 
Y, F, and K, it then follows from equations (8) and (3c) that  output, Y,  equilibrium 
capital, K, and the capital aggregate, F, will grow at a rate a + n, when there are no 
constraints on investment. 
 Finally, aggregate employment equals:  
 
E = (1 – u*).NL + NH          (9) 
 
and the average real wage rate net of unemployment taxes is: 
 
w = [(1 – tu).wL.(1 – u*).NL + wH.NH]/E      (10) 
 
In the long run employment will grow at a rate n and the wage rate at a rate a  - compare 
equations (3.a) and (3.b). We will use the properties of equations (7) – (10) in the long 
run model of the next section. 
 
4. The long-run model of the economy 
In the previous section, we presented a model of the labour market, where we assumed 
the capital stock to be determined at its equilibrium level for a given world market 
interest rate r*. In this section we add household behavior to the model, to include 
                                                 
12 Alternatively, equation (8) could be found be solved for by substituting equation (1) with equilibrium 
employment levels in the definition of the cost shares 1 – α = (r* +  δ).K/Y. Using (6) and (7) does not use 
the marginal productivity conditions, whereas using (3c) and (1) with the employment levels found earlier 
does not use the income shares.   
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consumption and savings behavior. The overlapping generations structure of the model 
allows us to analyse the influence of the ageing process and of immigration on 
consumption and savings. Moreover, the possible presence of a home bias in asset 
formation also affects capital accumulation and economic growth – next to the impact of 
both ageing and immigration on productivity growth. The resulting model enables us to 
discuss the interaction between economic growth, the labour market and the welfare state. 
The welfare state plays a role in the analysis through the pay-as-you-go pension system, 
next to the provision of unemployment benefits.  
We show that the model reproduces the ageing problem in a coherent way and 
provides a convenient tool to analyse the various ways in which immigration can enhance 
economic growth. 
 
4.1. Household behaviour 
 To model consumption and savings behavior, next to the pension system, we distinguish 
between two generations. The younger generation (‘young’ for short) consists of Ny 
persons, of which E are working, saving and paying pension contributions. Aggregate 
employment equals E = (1 – u*).NL + NH and the average real wage rate is w. The 
remaining part of the younger generation is either unemployed or not in the labour force. 
The older generation (‘old’ for short) lives from pension benefits and dissavings; it 
consists of No persons.  
The young contribute a share tp of their income to pension benefits of the old in a 
pay-as-you-go system.  The young both earn wages and have income from assets – we 
assume the young to own a share φ of total assets A in the economy. Disposable income 
of the young, Yy, then equals: 
 
Yy = (1 – tp).[w.E + r.φ.A]  (11) 
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The employed young consume a share c of their disposable income.13 The unemployed consume 
their benefits B = tu.wL.(1 – u*).NL. 
Disposable income of the old, Yo, consists of their income from assets and the 
pension benefits financed by the young: 
 
Yo = r.( 1 – φ).A + tp.[w.E + r.φ.A]       (12) 
 
The old do not only consume their disposable income, but also their asset stock at a rate 
ξ; hence their dissavings equal ξ.(1 – φ).A.  
Domestic savings then equal savings of the young minus dissavings of the old: 
 
S = (1 – c).Yy – ξ.( 1 – φ).A        (13) 
 
Hence consumption is C = c.Yy + B + Yo + ξ.(1 – φ).A, and the accounting identities X = Yy + Yo 
+ B = wgE + rA = C + S  do hold for national income X, where wg = (wL.(1 – u*).NL + wH.NH)/E 
is the gross wage rate per worker. The difference of national income with GDP, Y = wgE + rK, is 
net foreign income. We discuss that in the next section. 
 
4.2. Accumulation of capital and assets 
As we discussed in section 3.3 above, both output and equilibrium capital will grow at a 
rate a + n, when there are no constraints on investment. However, when investment I is 
constrained for reasons we discuss below, the capital stock equals K < K* and a different 
rate of growth might result. One should realise that in that case firms also make profits, 
which they keep as retained earnings. These profits are given by: 
 
π = r*(K* – K)         (14) 
 
Taking into account that capital depreciates at a rate δ, gross investment I follows from: 
 
                                                 
13 The constant propensity to consume of the young and full consumption of the old is consistent with 
intertemporal optimising behaviour; see for instance Razin and Sadka (2001) – see also stylised fact (3) 
from section 2. 
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I = K – (1 – δ).K-1            (15) 
 
Since both savings S and retained earnings by firms π contribute to asset accumulation, 
we find: 
 
A = A-1 + S + π         (16) 
 
In a closed economy version of our model national income, Yy + Yo, equals GDP, 
Y, and assets are equal to the capital stock – there are no retained earnings. Asset 
accumulation then follows from K = K-1 + S and consistency with investment requires: S 
= I – δK-1, see equation (15). The equality between savings and net-investment is 
obtained by adjustment of the interest rate. As a consequence the interest rate is 
endogenous and no longer given by the world market. This is for instance the case in 
Razin and Sadka (2001).  
 The situation is different in an open economy context, where national income 
differs from GDP by net foreign income from abroad. Our stylised fact (5) shows that this 
has been positive for decennia in the Netherlands. In an open economy version of our 
model with perfect capital movements assets accumulate according to equation (16). In 
that case capital accumulates at a rate of growth a + n as we discussed above; it has an 
impact on S via w but there is no feedback from assets A on capital K.  
   We prefer a more general approach which encompasses both extremes of a closed 
economy and an open economy with perfect capital movments. Due to the presence of a 
home bias and habit formation, we assume that a certain proportion µ of the assets in a 
country will be invested in the domestic capital stock with no impact of a small open 
economy like the Netherlands on the world market interest rate r* – see also Holinski, 
Kool and Muysken (2009) and Mondria and Wu (2010). Moreover, due to home bias and 
habit formation in the rest of the world, the gap between the desired capital stock and 
domestically available assets can be filled through capital flows by only a fraction λ, a 
parameter for openness in regard to capital flows. This implies for the capital stock 
 
K = (1 – λ).µA + λ.K*         (17) 
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One sees that when both λ = 0 and µ = 1, holds A = K and we are in the closed economy 
situation and savings equal investment – the endogenous interest rate then also guarantees 
that (3c) holds with equality but probably at a different interest rate. When λ = 1 we find 
K = K* – then home bias plays no role and there are no constraints on investment. In that 
case the equilibrium capital stock K* will always be obtained at the world market interest 
rate, compare equation (8). For values of openness between these extremes, lower home 
asset preference and lower openness reduce the capital stock if desired capital K*>µA. 
This can be seen by subtraction of K* from both sides of (17).     
 In our more general approach we can derive from equations (11), (13), (14) and 
(16): 
 
r*K* - r*(1 - T. α*)K  =  [1 - T.φ.r* + ξ.( 1 – φ)].A - A-1    (18) 
 
with α* = α /(1 – α), T = (1 – c)(1 – tp) and using α*r*K =wE. Combining this with 
equation (17), in the constrained case, and the observation that K* grows at a rate a + n, 
i.e. 
 
K* = (1 + a + n). K*-1        (19) 
 
yields a dynamic system of three equations in K, K* and A. The dynamics of the system 
(17) – (19) is analysed in Appendix 3.  
 We concentrate on stable cases of imperfect capital movements, λ < 1, and some 
home investment µ > 0, that lead to a positive steady-state value for the ratios A/K* and 
K/K*.14 Moreover, we are in particular interested in the impact of the rate of contribution 
tp on capital. In the Appendix we show that higher pension premiums tp lead to lower 
values of the capital to efficient capital ratio, K/K*, provided some home bias is present. 
Hence we find: 
                                                 
14 Several other cases are discussed in Appendix 3.   
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K/K* = k(tp)  k’< 0        (20) 
 
Starting from an initial value ݐ௣כ , a fall in tp then will lead to higher capital growth in the 
transition process. The intuition is that a higher contribution rate leads to a lower rate of 
capital growth, since fewer funds are available for investment, because they are used for 
the consumption of the old as in equation (12). As a consequence a lower capital stock 
will result in the steady state and in the transition. 
 
Figure 4 The CA and SE-curves 
 
The downward sloping relation between the capital ratio k and the contribution rate tp is 
presented in Figure 4. We name this relationship the capital-accumulation or CA-curve, 
since for each contribution rate tp we get a different capital ratio, as long as capital 
accumulation is related to growth of domestic assets, λ < 1. The curve will shift upwards 
when the propensity to consume c decreases, since more income then will be saved at the 
same contribution rate. The same occurs when the old dissave less, that is when ξ 
decreases or φ increases, and when productivity growth and population growth, a + n, 
decrease. Finally, a higher share of labour income α and a higher interest rate r also lead 
tp
K 
K* 
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to an upward shift of the CA-curve. When λ = 1, i.e. absence of home bias, the CA-curve 
is the horizontal line at unity. 
 
4.3. Social equilibrium in the welfare state 
Next to unemployment compensation, see the discussion in section 2.2, social 
equilibrium in the welfare state also requires that consumption per capita of the old is at 
least equal to a constant fraction η of consumption per capita of the young. This is a 
matter of social responsibility, since the old have contributed in their young days to the 
development of the economy as it is now for the young. Moreover, political reality 
requires that the old have sufficient benefits, since they represent a growing part of the 
electorate in an ageing economy. Social equilibrium then requires: 
 
η.c.Yy/Ny = [Yo + ξ.( 1 – φ).A]/No       (21) 
 
where Ny and No represent the number of young and old, respectively. The term in 
brackets of equation (21) is consumption of the old.  
 Substituting equations (11) and (12) in equation (21) yields: 
 
ܭ ൌ  ቈ ଵఎ.௖.൫ଵ – ௧೛൯.ಿ೚ಿ೤  – ௧೛ 
. ௥ା క௥ .
ଵ – ఝ
ןכ െ
ఝ
ןכ቉ . ܣ ൌ ݔଵ. ܣ       (22) 
 
Combining this equation with equation (17) yields in the constrained case:15 
 
ܭ ൌ ߣ  ௫భ௫భିሺଵ – ఒሻ.ஜ ܭ
כ           (23) 
  
Equation (23) shows that the rate of growth of capital consistent with social equilibrium 
is that of K*, a + n, as long as the other parameters of the model remain constant. 
However, any change in the parameters constituting x1 will lead to a change in the ratio 
K/K* and hence will have at least intermediate growth effects. For instance, an increase 
                                                 
15 Provided that holds: ݐ௣ ൐ ൤ߟ. ܿ. ே
೚
ே೤ െ
ଵ – ఝ
 ఝା൫ଵ – ఒ൯.ஜןכ .
௥ା క
௥ ൨ / ቀ1 ൅  ߟ. ܿ.
ே೚
ே೤ ቁ ൐ 0. This also ensures x1 > 0. 
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in the rate of contribution tp will lead to an increase in the ratio K/K* and hence to at least 
a temporary increase in the growth rate of K. This is intuitively plausible since a higher 
rate of growth implies higher consumption growth of the young relative to the old when 
the contribution rate is low. This may compensate the effect that a higher premium 
increases consumption of the old relative to that of the young.  
For that reason the social equilibrium equation (23) is presented as the increasing 
SE-curve in Figure 4. The curve will shift downwards when the share of the old, η, is 
getting higher, or the propensity to consume c has increased. By implication, ageing moves 
the economy from equilibrium point A to B with a higher pension premium and a lower capital 
stock and therefore a lower transitional growth of the economy. Finally the curve shifts 
upwards in case of a lower share of labour income in GDP α and a lower return on 
investment r. 
The SE-curve intersects with the CA-curve at the contribution rate tp*.16 The 
steady state capital stock is given by K = k(tp*).K* and grows at a rate a + n. 
 
4.4. Economic growth in an ageing economy and the impact of immigration 
The model we have developed above, and which is summarised in Figure 4, can be used 
to illustrate the ageing problem outlined in section 2. In our model ageing is respresented 
by an increase in the ratio of old to young, No/Ny. In terms of Figure 4 ageing then 
induces a downward shift of the SE-curve. Starting from equilibrium in point A on the 
intersection of the CA-curve and the SE-curve, at a rate of growth a + n, and a rate of 
contributions tp*, the downward shift of the SE-curve leads to a higher rate of 
contributions and a lower rate of growth. The intuition is that a larger part of the income 
of the economy cannot be used for capital formation but is necessary to provide 
consumption for the old and therefore reduces savings. The economy will shift along the 
CA-curve to point B and beyond, if ageing continues. If all other things remain equal, 
ageing will lead to a continuously lower growth rate and require ever higher pension 
contributions to maintain social equilibrium. This summarises the ageing problem in a 
concise way. 
                                                 
16 The contribution rate tp* is defined by solving tp from 
 ௫భ
௫భିሺଵ – ఒሻ.ஜ ൌ ݇ሺݐ௣ሻ . 
     21
Although we focus in our model on the restrictions to capital growth, there are 
also other mechanisms through which ageing of the economy will lead to lower growth, 
in particular lower growth per capita. To elaborate this, we decompose GDP per capita as 
follows: 
 
௒
௉ ൌ
௒
௄ .
௄
ா .
ா
ே .
ே
௉           (24) 
 
where E represents employment, N the labour force and P population. Since in our model 
both the interest rate and the share of labour income are fixed, the capital output ratio is 
fixed too and output growth equals the growth of capital. This explains why the first term 
of the right-hand side of equation (24) is constant, and output growth follows from the 
model above, as is summarised in Figure 4.  
The growth rate of the second term of the right-hand side converges in our model 
to productivity growth a. There is ample evidence of a negative impact of ageing on 
productivity: Although most macroeconomic studies are quite agnostic about the 
mechanisms, they find consistently an inverse U-shaped relation between the share of 
workers in different age groups and productivity – see Feyrer (2007), Gómez and 
Hernández de Cos (2008), Werding (2008) and Lindh and Malmberg (2009). Most 
studies point at microeconomic evidence which shows that experience increases with age 
in initial stages, but has decreasing returns later on.17 As a consequence of the negative 
impact of ageing on productivity, the CA-curve will shift upwards in Figure 4 (see also 
Appendix 2). Hence this constitutes an additional channel through which the ageing 
problem intensifies as reflected by a higher value of tp, but it also leads to higher values 
of  K/K* and K/E. 
The secular decrease in unemployment in the Netherlands, see Figure 3 above, led 
to an increase in the ratio of employment to labour force (although this should be 
corrected for hours worked per person), compare the third term of the right-hand side in 
equation (24). However, as we also mentioned in section 2, the share of old persons in the 
population increased strongly, inducing a decrease in the last term of the right-hand side. 
                                                 
17 For microeconomic evidence see Vandenberghe and Waltenberg (2010) and the literature reviewed 
therein. See also OECD (2008, Box 1.7) for a nuanced view. 
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The expectation for the future is that this last effect will be dominant. From that 
perspective it is not surprising that economic policy is focusing on reducing the ratio old 
relative to young – or more precisely, to increase the ratio of the working to the inactive 
population. One way to enhance this process is to increase the retirement age – in the 
model some ‘old’ then become ‘young’ and the SE-curve shifts upwards in Figure 4, 
mitigating the impact of the ageing problem. A similar effect is obtained by encouraging 
immigration, which usually consists of young persons. This leads to both an upward shift 
in the SE-curve and increased economic growth through growth in labour supply.  
Next to the demographic effect there is also another mechanism which is 
important in case of skill neutral migration. Kim, Levine and Lotti (2010) argue that skill 
neutral migration enhances growth for two reasons. First since migration takes usually 
place from low productivity to high productivity countries, economic growth is 
enhanced.18 Second, immigrants usually start in jobs for which they are overqualified, 
this also enhances productivity growth. Some evidence for the latter is provided by Huber 
cs. (2010). Following the positive impact of immigration on productivity growth, the CA-
curve will shift downwards in Figure 4. However, this indirect negative effect on the rate 
of growth will probably be overcompensated by the positive direct effect on the growth 
rate of effective capital. This provides an additional channel through which immigration 
enhances economic growth. 
For all these reasons a higher rate of growth can be realised through immigration, 
without increasing the rate of pension contributions – provided that the immigrants are 
included in the workforce. Variants on this line of argumentation are also followed by the 
United Nations, the European Union and the OECD in their advice to allow for more 
immigration (UN, 2000; EU, 2005; OECD, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 This effect may be dampened if the movement goes from high productivity sectors in poor countries to 
low productivity sectors on rich countries, because if the migration is skill neutral in the host country it is 
kill biased in the country of origin. Moreover, if the countries of origin switch from innovating to non-
innovation in reaction to the migration this will also reduce growth; e.g. the critical level of human capital 
in Romer-type models of technical may not be reached anymore (see Rivera-Batiz and Xie, 1993).   
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5. Empirical evidence on the impact of immigration on GDP/capita for the 
Netherlands, 1973 -2009 
In the previous section we argued that immigration has a positive impact on economic 
growth through two channels. First the ratio of active over inactive persons, the activity 
rate Ny/No in our model, has a positive impact on the growth rate and therefore 
immigration has a positive effect too, if the percentage increase in active persons is larger 
than that of inactive persons. The second channel is that immigration enhances 
productivity growth. In this section we provide some empirical evidence for these 
statements using data for the Netherlands.  
To analyse the first channel, the crucial question is, which impact immigration has 
on the ratio of hours worked per person in the population and which impact the latter has 
on GDP per capita. For that reason we use the ratio of the total hours worked, L, over the 
total population, P, to capture the activity rate. In the first channel capital accumulation 
also plays an important role – see Figure 4 above. For that reason we also include the 
investment to GDP ratio in our analysis. Finally, important features of our theoretical 
model are that the unemployment rate is not affected by skill neutral immigration, and 
wage growth remains consistent with productivity growth. We therefore also include 
wages and unemployment in our empirical analysis. Since productivity growth cannot be 
observed directly, we can only measure the impact of the second channel indirectly. 
Because we find that immigration indeed has a positive impact of economic growth, but 
the impact on investment is only marginal, if not negative, we conclude that the second 
channel plays an important role. 
     Our empirical analysis is on the Netherlands, during the period 1973 – 2009. The 
data for population, GDP per capita and gross fixed capital formation in constant 2000 
Euros are taken from the World Development Indicators. Wage data are labour 
compensation per hour worked deflated by the GDP deflator from the KLEMS data base 
with adjustment of their base year from 1995 to 2000, and two observations added using 
growth rates from CPB. Employed persons in terms of 1000 full-time equivalents, hours 
worked per full-time equivalent and unemployment data come from the CPB using the 
international definition for the latter. Migration data are from the CBS. Precise sources 
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are provided in Appendix 1, and a general description of the data used has been given in 
section 2. 
The empirical analysis proceeds in two steps.19 First, we want to show that total 
hours worked per person in the population, which is lower under ageing and probably 
higher under immigration, has a positive impact on the GDP per capita. We estimate a 
vector-error correction model in the natural logarithm of (i) GDP per capita, log(y), (ii) 
the ratio of gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP, log(I/Y), (iii) the ratio of 
hours worked by thousand full-time equivalent workers per person in the population, 
log(L/P), (iv) real wages, log(w), (v) the unemployment rate, u, and (vi) net immigration 
per person in the population, NMP = (im-em)/P. Since we find that net immigration 
indeed has a positive impact on hours worked per person, we also use the estimated 
model to analyse the impact of both a temporary and a permanent shock in net 
immigration. Consistent with our model predictions, we find that immigration has a 
positive impact on GDP per capita for both types of shocks. The short-run effects can be 
somewhat volatile, however. 
The vector-error correction model used in the first step of our analysis uses three 
lags and information on longer lags is ignored. Moreover, for policy recommendations 
the relevant policy variable is gross rather than net immigration. For those reasons we 
investigate in the second step of our analysis to what extent gross immigration has a 
positive impact on the L/P ratio when more lags are allowed for. Our findings indicate 
that the positive impact of immigration on hours per person vanishes after ten years. The 
challenge for immigration and integration policies therefore is to find a way to increase 
the activity rate permanently after immigration. 
 
5.1 The vector-error correction model (VECM) 
A vector-autoregressive model (VAR) in the six variables indicated above and a time 
trend is unstable if it has four lags. When only three lags are allowed, all lag length 
                                                 
19 The indication for unit roots according to standard augmented Dickey-fuller tests are ambiguous. 
Muysken et al. (2008) found absence of unit roots using fewer observations. This result is typical of unit 
root test with lower power at lower numbers of observations. The probabilities for unit roots were low 
though, when regressors in addition to constant and trend, the package routine, were included (see 
Davidson and MacKinnon 2004, chap. 14.4).  However, variables that are integrated of order zero and unity 
can both be included in error-correction models. Therefore we do not present results for unit roots. 
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criteria but one (Schwarz Information Criterion) indicate that three lags are optimal. The 
VAR with three lags is stable. The corresponding Johansen cointegration test with two 
lags indicates five cointegrating equations,20 which are long-term economic relations, at 
the 5% significance level for MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis p-values according to both the 
trace test and the maximum-eigenvalue test. These long-term relations, with the left-hand 
side equal to zero in equilibrium, are as follows (with t-values in parentheses): 
 
CE1 = log(y)t-1  – 0.865log(L/P) t-1 – 0.0155trend – 9.64    (25) 
    (-34.0)                  (-33.6)                 
  
CE2 = log(I/Y) t-1  + 0.42log(L/P) t-1 + 0.0023trend – 2.99      (26) 
                                 (5.35)                   (3.92) 
                                  
CE3 = log(L/P)t-1 –169.7(NMP)t-1 – 0.0298trend +1.90    (27) 
                  (-52.6)                (-6.54)          
 
CE4 = (NMP) t-1  – 0.0084log(w) t-1  + 0.002trend + 0.014    (28) 
        (-23.05)             (9.16)   
 
CE5 = log(w) t-1 + 0.03u t-1  – 0.007trend – 2.79     (29) 
     (17.69)     (-8.12) 
  
 
Equation (25) indicates that a percentage change in L/P translates into the GDP per capita 
with a factor of 0.865.21 Note that on the basis of a linearly homogenous production 
function, Y/P = F(K/P, L/P) and a marginal product of capital equal to the sum of given – 
through perfect capital movements – interest and depreciation rates, a simplified version 
of equation (3c) above, one would expect a one-to-one relation between L/P and Y/P. 
Clearly our result of 0.86 is close to the one-to-one relation and suggests the greater 
realism of equation (3c) and slightly imperfect capital movements as in our theoretical 
model. The investment ratio decreases by a factor 0.42 according to equation (26) – we 
interpret that as a substitution effect between labour and capital. Net immigration 
                                                 
20 Identification of the r=5 cointegrating vectors requires at least r-1=4 restrictions setting coefficients in 
the long-term relations to zero (see Patterson 2000, chap.14). As we have six variables in each long-term 
relation four zeros lead to bi-variate long-term relations.  
21 For the related literature on migration and growth based on closed economy models see Boubtane and 
Dumont (2010).     
     26
increases the hours-per-person ratio according to equation (27), which is consistent with 
the notion in our theoretical model that immigration increases the activity rate Ny/No – we 
elaborate the estimated impact of a shock in net immigration on the other variables 
below. Unemployment decreases the wage in equation (29), which is the well-known 
Phillips curve effect. And wages enhance net immigration in equation (28) – this is 
consistent with observations by Nannenstad (2007). Moreover, equations (28), (27) and 
(25) imply a two-way causality between growth and migration.22  
All equations have highly significant time trends. At a constant L/P ratio there 
would be a growth rate of 1.55% in equation (25) as one finds it in the growth literature – 
see Jones (1995) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). This should also be 
approximately the long-run growth rate of wages in equation (29). However, the trend in 
equation (29) is considerably smaller due to the strong fall in unemployment during the 
time period under consideration (see Figure 3 above). The significant time trend in 
equation (28) also captures the trend in wages and that of emigration (see Figure 2 
above). The small but significant time trend in equation (26) is probably a feature of the 
time under consideration with a slightly decreasing investment ratio, but will probably 
not be a long-run property. Finally, the time trend in equation (27) indicates that the 
increase in hours per person since 1985 is stronger than the fall from 1970 to 1985. As 
the investment share, I/Y, and working hours per person, L/P, and the unemployment rate 
are very unlikely to grow in the long run their time-trends should not be interpreted as 
steady-state results. Indeed, solving the long-term relation (25)-(29) for a constant 
unemployment rate u of 4%, we get very small growth rates for the I/Y and L/P ratios: -
0.0032 and 0.002 respectively.    
    The complete VECM consists of the following six equations (t-values in parentheses, 
R2 are adjusted), where we do not show the first and second lags of first differences of all 
variables here (these are shown in Appendix 4; their position is indicated by ‘…’): 
 
                                                 
22 In contrast, on the basis of bi-variate correlations Ortega and Peri (2009) find no impact of bilateral 
migration on the L/P ratio for a panel of OECD countries, 1980-2005. Similarly, Morley (2006) uses an 
ARDL approach for two variables, immigration per capita and GDP per capita, and finds causality going 
from GDP to immigration but not the other way around for Australia, Canada and the USA, 1930-2002. 
Note, that two-variable approaches can have only one cointegrating equation for the analysis of two 
directions of causality. Our multi-variable approach has one cointegrating relation for each causality 
direction under consideration.   
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 d(log(y)) = -0.62CE1 +0.66CE2 +0.366CE3 +59.2CE4 +1.22CE5+…+ 0.017       (30) 
        (-2.13)    (4.32)        (2.65)          (2.73)        (5.8)               (1.36) R2: 0.54 
       
d(log(I/Y)) = -1.14CE1 +          0.69CE3 + 108.36CE4 +1.84CE5 + …-0.048      (31) 
                      (-2.06)                (3.23)          (3.33) (6.49)          (-2.84) R2: 0.78 
     
d(log(L/P)) =   0.256CE2 + 0.148CE3+ 23.06CE4+ 0.46CE5+…-0.0036     (32) 
                        (2.94)        (2.06)          (1.96)           (3.8)          (-0.52) R2:0 .77 
 
d(u) =            -21.65CE1 - 11.93CE2 -16.36CE3 -2485CE4 - 24.08CE5+… -0.07      (33) 
                      (-2.18)         (-3.65)       (-4.75)         (-4.78)   (-5.16)       (-0.25) R2:0.86 
       
d(log(w)) = 1.18CE1 - 0.37CE2 + 0.38CE3 + 62.07CE4 - 0.36CE5 +…+ 0.04     (34) 
                   (2.71)       (-2.29)        (2.61)        (2.83)         (-1.74)          (3.43)    R2: 0.74 
 
d(NMP) =   0.07CE1 +        0.02CE3 + 2.26CE4 + …         +0.0003     (35) 
         (2.7)        (2.54)  (1.97)                               (0.41)  R2: 0.58 
 
Adjustment coefficients with t-values below unity have been restricted to zero before 
each re-estimation in order to keep the model simpler. For the imposed restrictions the 
LR test has a significance level of p(χ2)=0.50. 
Equation (30) is a growth equation, where the standard population growth term 
has been replaced by the log(L/P) term and the arguments are spread over all error-
correction terms. For example investment enters via the second error-correction term, 
CE2. Equation (31) is an investment equation, where the growth rate of the investment 
ratio depends on all error-correction terms besides the long-term relation for investment 
itself. Equations (32) – (35) show feedback effects of the cointegrating equations on 
changes of L/P, unemployment, wage rates and immigration. Only equations (31), (32) 
and (35) have in total four insignificant adjustment coefficients, which have been 
constrained to zero. 
    We demonstrate the working of the model in Figure 5, which shows the results of a 
dynamic stochastic simulation with thousand runs of a Monte Carlo approach (only using 
the observed values in the base year(s) as starting values for the variables).23 The data for 
unemployment are outside the interval of two standard deviations only for the period of 
the second oil crisis in 1979; data for hours worked per person and net immigration are 
                                                 
23 Data are in natural logarithms except for migration and unemployment. 
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outside the interval after the start of the wage-moderation policy in 1982 and for 
investment share in both of these periods. In brief, only during times of severe shocks do 
the data go out of the interval of two standard errors.     
 
Figure 5  Dynamic Stochastic simulation of the VCEM model (with ± 2SE bounds) 
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In particular, our model nicely traces the u-shaped development of hours per person, L/P, 
with its minimum value in 1985, the inverted u-shape of the unemployment data and a 
similar but much milder inverted u-shape in the net immigration data. This is remarkable 
because the model is based on a linear VAR. Each economic variable though has in 
principle three types of coefficients, those in the long term relation, the adjustment 
coefficients, and the coefficients of the first-differenced lags. Together they are well 
capable of capturing non-linear developments in the data.  
 A second observation from the simulation results presented in Figure 5 is that the 
endogenously simulated development of all variables over the next twenty years shows 
time trends which are quite plausible.  This shows that in the out of sample simulation the 
time trends in the long term relations do not cause serious problems, at least in the 
medium run. 
 A third observation is that the estimation results are very robust as we found in 
various earlier versions of this paper. In Muysken et al. (2008) we estimated the model in 
single equation form, using data till 2003/2005, and using slightly different sources; in 
Muysken and Ziesemer (2011a) we estimated the model in an error correction 
specification, without migration, using data till 2007; and in Muysken and Ziesemer 
(2011b) we estimated the model in an error correction specification, including gross 
immigration, using data till 2009. The conclusions and simulation results from all these 
estimations are remarkably similar to the analysis of this paper, where we also used data 
till 2009. Hence the results are quite robust with respect to the periods of observation and 
the data sources. 
 A final point which should be observed is that the estimation results using either 
gross or net immigration or joint or separate estimation of the equations for migration are 
also highly similar. In Muysken and Ziesemer (2011a, b) we found similar results for 
gross immigration rather than net immigration.24 This can be seen as an indication that it 
                                                 
24 When gross immigration and gross emigration both as a share of the population are considered 
separately, immigration has no unit root but emigration does, and they are not cointegrated – all with and 
without logs, with and without dividing by the population. The estimation in first differences with use of an 
ARMA(4,4) then is (t-values in parentheses)   
 
D(log(em/p)) =  0.012 -0.24D(log(im/p)) Adj. R2 = 0.35 
                       (1.16)  (-3.91) 
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is in particular immigration which is the main driving force in the relation between 
migration and growth, at least in the Dutch and Western European context. That 
observation might also be one of the explanations why migration policy is mainly 
focussed on immigration rather than emigration. 
 
5.2 Effects from net immigration shocks 
Consistent with our theoretical model, we have found that net immigration indeed has a 
positive impact on hours worked per person. We then can use the empirical model results 
to simulate the effect of a shock in net immigration on the other variables in the model – a 
much debated answer to the ageing problem. We look at the effects of both a temporary 
shock and a permanent shock. In both cases we find a positive effect on GDP per capita 
in the long run, but the transition path shows some volatility, also depending on the 
nature of the shock. 
 
Permanent effects and adjustment from a transitory net immigration shock 
We illustrate that the working of the complete model is in line with the long-term 
relations (27) and (25) by applying a temporary shock to the immigration variable and 
looking at the impulse response. The result can be seen in Figure 6.25 The shock equals 
one standard error of the regression of equation (35), 0.0008, which corresponds to 
12,700 persons in addition to the present immigration, when evaluated at a constant 
population of 16 million inhabitants. It has a persistent though small long term effect on 
its own value. The long-term impact on the L/P ratio is 0.0027, about a quarter of a 
percent. In line with (25) the impact on the GDP per capita is about 0.0024 in the long 
run. Investment shares are slightly reduced indicating a sectoral shift to low-skill sectors 
in the past, when migration was allowed in order to prevent sector movements to low-
wage countries. The shock to immigration can be seen as a supply shock or as a removal 
of a constraint on labour demand. Following the latter interpretation, hence lifting the  
                                                                                                                                                 
If the growth rate of immigration increases by one percentage point, that of emigration decreases by 0.24 
percentage points. Together with the absence of cointegration this is a non-negligible but still weak 
correlation. Both procedures, using net or gross immigration seem legitimate, and lead to similar results. In 
that respect it is interesting to observe that van Dalen and Henkes (2011) emphasise that emigration in the 
Netherlands is not driven primarily by economic factors. 
25 Technically speaking this is a response to a non-factorized one standard deviation of an NMP innovation 
on: log(y), log(I/Y), log(L/P), u, log(w) and NMP. 
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Figure 6 Response to a transitory positive net immigration shock 
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advantages are larger than disadvantages on net.26 A migration policy trying to yield the 
long run advantages should therefore phase in additional immigration carefully.   
 
Effects of a permanent shock in net immigration  
A permanent shock on net immigration is carried out as an increase of the intercept of 
equation (35) from 1975 onwards. This value of 0.312*10-3 is enlarged by 0.148*10-3, 
where the latter is 10% of the mean of net immigration as a share of the population, 
NMP. We run two deterministic, dynamic forecasts, one without any shock (baseline) and 
one with a permanent shock as described above. We then show in Figure 7 the value after 
the shock compared to the baseline. 
    Figure (7a) shows that the permanent migration shock increases net immigration for 
the period 1975-2005, with the exception of the 2nd oil crisis year 1979.27 Unemployment 
first goes up for six years and thereafter it is lower. Correspondingly, wages in Figure 
(7b) are first lower and then higher. Parallel with unemployment, the activity rate, L/P, 
first decreases and then increases, and GDP per capita reacts in the same way. The 
investment/GDP ratio first is lower as all other variables, then increases, but until 2030 it 
falls by almost 1%-point. All effects are fairly small, but growing over time because of 
the significant time trends in the estimates. The effects are also similar to those of the 
transitory shock, in particular in the long run – but the positive effects appear earlier 
under a permanent shock. Again the early negative effects might be mitigated by a 
careful phasing in of the shock towards its long-run level.   
 
Long-run effects of a permanent shock in net immigration  
In our analysis of a transitory shock we find clearly positive effects only after 10 years 
and in case of a permanent shock after seven years. However, in both cases the effects are 
below 2% even after 30 years. An alternative way of looking at the effect of a permanent 
shock in the long run is to look at the long-run implied by our empirical model. 
                                                 
26 Therefore our results are in line with those of Jean and Jimenez (2011) who find no impact of 
immigration on unemployment for OECD countries for the period 1984-2003. Cohen-Goldner and 
Paserman (2004) also find a short-run fall in wages that vanishes after four to seven years for Israel 1989 – 
99. They find no short or long-run effect on unemployment. Ottaviano and Peri (2009) find that average 
wages are falling in the short run and increasing in the long run, as we do.  
27 The average increase is 0.259*10-3 which is higher than the shock of 0.148*10-3. The reason is that the 
wage increase will also attract more immigrants. 
     33
 
Figure 7a Impact of permanent shock on net immigration and unemployment 
  (absolute difference with base line) 
 
 
Figure 7b Impact of permanent shock on other variables (relative to base line) 
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The long-term relations (25)-(29) are five equations in six variables. If we assume a 
constant unemployment rate of u of 4%,28 which is observed in the Netherlands for the 
more recent years, we can solve the system for the other five variables. If we increase the 
intercept of the solution for the net immigration rate again by 10% of the mean of net 
immigration, 0.148*10-3, or equivalently multiply the intercept of (28) by a factor 0.9895, 
the increases in the values are as follows: 
d(nmp) = 0.148*10-3 or 2350 persons; 
dlog(L/P) = 0.0251 (2.5%)  
dlog(I/Y) = 0.0105 (1%) 
dlog(w) = 0 because we keep u=4 fixed29 
dlog(y) = 0.0217 (2.17%) 
 
A change by 10% of the mean value of net immigration (23,500 persons) at a constant 
unemployment rate increases the activity rate, L/P, by 2.5%, the investment/GDP ratio by 
1% and GDP per capita by 2.17%. This is the same order of magnitude as that of Figure 7 
for a permanent shock to the whole system.  
   For all three types of shock assumptions more net immigration leads to a higher activity 
rate and a higher GDP per capita after some years. The size of these effects of course 
varies with the type of the shock and related assumptions. As immigration policies have 
been changing between more and less restrictive it is not obvious, which of our shock 
results is most realistic.  
Finally, our shock analysis has more positive results for the level of GDP per 
capita the longer the period is. This is consistent with the analysis of Felbermayr et al. 
(2008) who find a positive impact of the stock of migrants on the rate of growth in a 
cross-section study. As stocks of migrants are built up over time by flows of migrants it is 
important to see that in the short run the results may be less clear-cut.  
 
                                                 
28 This assumption is in line with the result by Cohen-Goldner and Paserman (2004) as well as Jean and 
Jimenez (2011) that immigration has no impact on unemployment and it is only a slight deviation from our 
result from the preceding shock analysis that unemployment reacts a little bit to immigration. 
29 Most empirical literature on the impact of immigration on wages has emphasized that the effects 
are at best small if not completely absent, with exceptions though especially for women, when 
analysing the occupational level ሺFriedberg and Hunt 1995; Steinhardt 2011ሻ. For a critical 
assessment of this position in the American debate, see Aydemir and Borjas (2011). 
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5.3 The impact of gross immigration on the activity rate 
Our empirical model used in the above analysis is a VECM, based on a VAR that has 
three lags. Information on longer lags is ignored. Moreover, for policy recommendations 
the relevant policy variable is gross rather than net immigration because restrictive 
policies on immigration can be relaxed easily, but it is more difficult to have an impact 
on emigration. For those reasons we investigate whether or not gross immigration has a 
positive impact on the L/P ratio when more lags are allowed for.  
As we want to employ many more lags than the VECM has, we re-run the VECM 
for gross immigration (not shown) and run a separate regression for log(L/P) on all 
variables that have an impact on it according to the equation corresponding to (32) and in 
addition to eleven lags of immigration per person of the population, im/P. Stepwise 
forward and backward regressions then result in a significantly positive effect of the early 
lags of immigration on the L/P ratio (not shown). However, lags seven and higher are 
mostly and increasingly negative. In order to get a bit more structured result we impose 
the assumption of a polynomial distributed lag of the third degree on the immigration 
variable.30 The results for the lags of the gross-immigration/population ratio are presented 
in Figure 8.31 From the ninth year after immigration onward, the impact of immigration 
im/P on the activity rate L/P is negative. The positive overall effect turns out to be 
insignificant in this regression – see Figure 8.  
The result also holds if we add more lags and if we replace the polynomial of 
third degree by one of degree two or one, albeit at the cost of getting more serial 
correlation. As we estimate twelve parameters with 37 observations, this result cannot be 
robust to all possible other changes. Our interpretation of the finding in Figure 8 is that 
even if some members of an immigrant family work, there are relatively more dependents 
after ten years. Moreover, as we found a significantly positive coefficient of immigration 
in a similar regression for persons in the labour force instead of hours worked in 
Muysken et al. (2008), less hours worked per person after the movement of labour-
intensive branches to low-wage countries might also be part of an explanation.  
 
                                                 
30 The third degree used has the advantage that it is sufficiently flexible, while one can avoid running into 
serial correlation.  
31 The details for the regression are presented in Appendix 3. 
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Figure 8:  
The impact of the lagged immigration/population ratio on the activity rate L/P 
 
      Lag Distribution of IM/P                 lag  i Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
               .*             |  0  0.13784  2.17645  0.06333 
               .       *      |  1  0.89298  1.17106  0.76254 
               .          *   |  2  1.35326  0.70032  1.93233 
               .            * |  3  1.55648  0.64705  2.40550 
               .            * |  4  1.54046  0.68592  2.24581 
               .          *   |  5  1.34299  0.69856  1.92252 
               .       *      |  6  1.00189  0.71325  1.40468 
               .    *         |  7  0.55496  0.75083  0.73912 
               *              |  8  0.04001  0.77827  0.05141 
           *   .              |  9 -0.50514  0.75307 -0.67078 
      *        .              |  10 -1.04270  0.74080 -1.40754 
  *            .              |  11 -1.53485  1.06694 -1.43855 
 Sum of Lags   5.33817  6.44655  0.82807 
 
Ageing requires a higher number of active persons. Our evidence shows that it is 
possible to increase the activity rate by immigration for some years. However, in later 
years the positive impact vanishes. For immigration to be a tool to help mitigating the 
ageing problem the impact on the activity rate requires policy improvements. If policy 
can arrange immigration in a way that hours worked relative to the population increase,32 
our VECM above shows that GDP per capita can increase by about 85% of the 
percentage change in the hours worked per person in the population. 
 
6. Concluding remarks  
In this paper we have extended the work of Razin and Sadka (2000), Kemnitz (2003), 
Boeri and Brücker (2005) and Brücker and Jahn (2011)  by analysing immigration in a 
general equilibrium context, including physical capital in a CES production function, 
using a right-to-manage wage bargaining model, and allowing for unemployment. The 
main conclusion from the theoretical model is that income per capita will increase due to 
immigration, under the condition that the immigrants find employment and contribute to 
the skill distribution at least proportionally to the native population. The increase in 
capital accumulation following immigration, turns out to be an additional determinant of 
economic growth when analysing the benefits of immigration. 
                                                 
32 See for example OECD (2008, Ch. 5) for considerations on improvements of immigration policies.  
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 Our empirical analysis for the Netherlands reveals that at least hours worked 
relative to the population must increase in order to get a positive impact of immigration 
on the economy. Thus to stimulate economic growth it is of utmost importance that 
immigration policy as a means to mitigate the aging problem should not only focus on the 
number of immigrants, but also on their employability by keeping the skill structure in 
line with the skill distribution of domestic labour market entrants. This requires two 
steps: (1) skill neutral admission of immigrants and (2) an education policy that has the 
ambition and ability to educate the second and third generations of immigrants, at least in 
line with the average skill distribution in a country. 
 Our conclusions support the view of the European Commission that immigrants in 
general have a positive impact on the economy provided that they are employed. As the 
European Commission puts it: “the current situation and prospects of EU labour markets 
can be broadly described as a ‘need’ scenario. Some Member States already experience 
substantial labour and skills shortages in certain sectors of the economy, which cannot be 
filled within the national labour markets. This phenomenon concerns the full range of 
qualifications - from unskilled workers to top academic professionals.” (EU, 2005, p. 
4).33 In line with this statement by the European Commission we argue, following our 
theoretical and empirical results, that the immigration policy of the European Union with 
respect to the blue card and the admission of some other specific groups is too restrictive 
to maximise the benefits from immigration in the light of an ageing population. 
 Finally, the expectations from immigration as a single cure for falling birth rates 
and an ageing population should not be too high, since it is only one policy instrument 
within a broader mix and it has only small effects as shown in our empirical analysis. 
Many countries in the European Union should worry about their high unemployment and 
low employment rates, and give more priority to increase employment. However, our 
analysis shows a slightly positive effect of immigration on employment after some years. 
Immigration policies should go hand in hand with active labour market policies and 
education policies to get the low-skilled unemployed back to work and to prevent young 
                                                 
33 More recent EU policy views are less optimistic on the positive impact of migration as is surveyed in 
Koehler cs. (2010).  However, in line with Koehler et al., we think that position is too pessimistic and 
reflects a defensive reaction in response to the recent crisis. 
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people, both natives and immigrants, from early school leaving, thereby raising their 
level of education and opportunities on the labour market – see also OECD (2008).  
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Appendix 1 The data used 
 
Variable Source Definition 
   
w KLEMS; Real wage (Labour compensation per hour worked deflated by GDP  
deflator 2000). This series is only available till 2007. 
P WDI Population (mid-year) 
y WDI GDP pc 
I/Y WDI Gfcf/GDP 
L WDI Labour force. total  
u CPB Unemployment rate; international definition 
EMPFTE CPB Employment in full-time equivalents 
hours CPB Working hours of a full-time employee (in hours/year)  
im CBS Immigration 
 
Em CBS       Emigration 
 
 
CBS:   Statline, http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/dome/default.aspx  
 
CPB:  CEP, 2011, http://www.cpb.nl/en/publication/central-economic-plan-2011 
 
KLEMS: EU KLEMS Productivity Report: http://www.euklems.net 
 
WDI:  World Development Indicators, Worldbank 
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Appendix 2 Wage bargaining, union behavior and social equilibrium 
 
For low-skilled workers the wage is determined by union bargaining, where the unions 
take both the employment of high-skilled workers, which follows from labour supply, 
and the capital stock as given. We assume a right-to-manage model, where the bargaining 
power by unions equals ε – this encompasses Kemnitz’ (2003) monopoly union model by 
setting ε = 1, and Razin and Sadka’s (2000) full competition when ε = 0. Denoting the 
level of unemployment benefits by b and assuming a tax rate tu, the expected income of a 
low-skilled worker is (1 – u).tu.wL + u.b, where u is the low-skilled unemployment rate, u 
= (NL – L)/NL. The firm negotiates with the unions about the wage, given its capital stock 
and employment of high skilled workers. The resulting wage then is found by 
maximising:34 
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with respect to wL, subject to equation (3a), and given K and H. This yields:35 
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where ψ(wL) is the low-skilled labour share in income as a function of the low-skilled 
wage, and ψ’(wL)< 0 when σ > 1. 36  
Equation (A2) cannot be solved explicitly for wL, due to the non-linear nature of 
ψ(wL).  For that reason we use a linear approximation of the first part of the right hand 
side, such that: 
 
. / ' (1 ). /(1 ) . . .( 1).
1 .( 1) / ' 1L Lu
u u bw w
t
        
              (A3) 
                                                 
34 See also Boeri and van Ours (2008, pp. 58 ff.). 
35 This is consistent with Kemnitz’ (2003) result when we assume a monopoly union and a Cobb-Douglas 
function, i.e. ε = 1 and σ = 1. 
36 We assume ψ(wL)>- ε.( σ-1) which always does hold for σ ≥ 1. 
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does hold, where ν > 0 is a constant and 
11
'    . This reproduces the important 
properties of the right hand side of (A2) following from ψ’(wL)< 0 when σ > 1, ψ(wL) 
approximates 1 when σ decreases towards 1 and ψ(wL) increases when λ increases. The 
wage rate then is given by:37 
 
. (1 ). '. /(1 ) .
[1 . .( 1)].[ ' .( 1)] 1L u
u u bw
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   
     
              (A4) 
 
Thus the negotiated low-skilled wage is a mark-up on the benefit level, which decreases 
with an increase in unemployment u as seems plausible. Both a fall in the tax rate, tu, and 
a rise in low-skilled labour augmenting productivity, λ, will decrease the mark-up. It is 
also interesting to note that a decrease in the elasticity of substitution leads to a higher 
mark-up, since in that case it is more difficult for low-skilled labour to take over the role 
of high-skilled labour. 
   Social equilibrium requires that the employed pay taxes at a rate tu to finance their 
unemployed colleagues. We assume a pay-as-you-go system where government sets the 
tax and benefit rates such that unemployment benefits are covered by tax revenues. Since 
we focus on low-skilled unemployment, we assume that the benefits are paid by taxes on 
the low-skilled wage only.38 That is, given a certain level of benefits b, consistency with a 
tax rate tu requires: 
 
tu.wL.L = b.(NL – L)         (A5) 
 
One should realise that either the tax rate tu or the benefit level b is endogenous. Kemnitz 
(2003) assumes the tax rate tu to be determined a priori by government. However, in line 
with the approach more commonly used in the literature – e.g. for instance Boeri and 
                                                 
37 Again, this is consistent with Kemnitz’ (2003) result when we assume a monopoly union and a Cobb-
Douglas function, i.e. ε = 1 and σ = 1. Since he assumes a monopoly union, Kemnitz finds no impact of 
unemployment on the mark-up. 
38 This assumption, which is in line with Kemnitz (2003), is motivated by analytical tractability. Including 
benefits paid by high skilled workers complicates the analysis considerably, without altering the qualitative 
results. 
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Brücker (2005) – we assume that government sets a replacement rate β with respect to the 
net wage, and then derives the tax rate from substituting b = β.(1– tu).wL in equation 
(A5).39,40  
When setting the replacement rate at β, we find from equation (A5) that the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment u* is given by:41  
 
 
1 . . [1 . .( 1)].[ ' .( 1)]* 1
1 (1 ). '.
u with          
            (4) 
 
  
                                                 
39 This approach would not work in the analysis of Kemnitz (2003), since he finds no impact of 
unemployment on the mark-up due to his assumption of a monopoly union. 
40 We assume that unions respect the choice of government of a fixed replacement rate, i.e. they don’t 
exploit it and therefore it is not included as an additional constraint on the maximisation problem of 
equation (4). 
41 A similar equation is used by Boeri and Brücker (2005), although they introduce this equation ad hoc.  
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Appendix 3  Asset and capital stock dynamics under home asset preference and 
perfect capital markets 
 
 The basic equations are (17) - (19). They can be rewritten as  
K= (1 - λ)μA + λK*         (17) 
 
A = A-1/d + (rK* - rK + fK)/d  with d ≡ 1 – [Tφr - ξ(1-φ)] and f=Tα*r  (18) 
 
K*= (1+a+n)K*-1         (19) 
 
This is a system of three difference equations in A, K, and K*. In order to transform it 
into one equation in b ≡ A/K*, we define k ≡ K/K*. Dividing both sides of (18) by K* 
and multiplying and dividing the first term by K*-1 and using (19) yields 
  
ܾ ൌ ܾିଵ ଵ௔ା௡ାଵ
ଵ
ௗ ൅
௥ି௥௞ା௙௞
ௗ         (19’) 
 
Dividing both sides of (18) by K* yields 
 
k= (1 - λ)μb + λ         (18’) 
 
Insertion of (18’) into (19’) yields a difference equation in b: 
 
ܾ ൌ ܾିଵ ଵ௔ା௡ାଵ
ଵ
ௗ ൅
௥ାሺ௙ି௥ሻሺ௥ሺଵ ି ఒሻఓ௕ ା ఒሻ
ௗ   
 
Putting b-terms to the left-hand side leaving its lag on the right-hand side yields 
 
ܾ ൌ ܾିଵ ଵሺ௔ା௡ାଵሻሺௗିఓሺଵିఒሻሺ௙ି௥ሻሻ ൅
௥ାሺ௙ି௥ሻఒ
ௗିఓሺଵିఒሻሺ௙ି௥ሻ  
 
This equation can be drawn with b on the vertical axis and b-1 on the horizontal axis. 
Realistic cases have a positive and constant long-run value of b=A/K* > 0. This requires 
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a negative or positive slope that is below unity and a positive intercept. We discuss three 
special cases, two of which fulfill this requirement: 
  
(i) The special case λ=1 of efficient capital K=K*, has an intercept f/d>0 and a 
slope 1/[(a+n+1)d], with d >1 as the expression Tφr in (18) is a product of 
four percentage expressions all smaller than unity. Other cases can be 
constructed but they also hold without λ=1 and are discussed below. 
(ii) A second special case is f=r. The interpretation of f is savings of wage income 
after taxes and pension premiums per unit of capital. The slope is as in the 
previous case and the intercept is r/d, which are both positive in non-
inflationary times of positive real interest rates.  
(iii) Amano’s (1965) case of negative and increasing net-foreign debt D:  
D/K≡ (K-A)/K=1 – A/K <0 requires a permanently positive growth of 
A/K=(A/K*)/(K/K*) =b/k. together with equation (18’) implies that k/b = (1 - 
λ)μ + λ/b should fall permanently, but it has a limit of (1 - λ)μ .When μ = 0 
and b going to infinity we find the minimum value of k/b = 0, then b/k is 
infinity. This requires a positive intercept and a slope larger than unity. 
(iv) A constant ratio D/K ≡ (K-A)/K ≡1-A/K > (<) 0, requires a constant 
A/K=(A/K*)/(K/K*)=b/k. According to (18’) this also requires a constant b.      
For our case of aging and immigration only cases of constant b are relevant. If b goes to a 
constant value it follows from (18’) that k=K/K* goes to a constant value. By implication 
b/k=A/K also go to a constant value. If b is constant, then A and K* grow at the same rate 
and K must have the same rate as well, which is a + n. 
 We are in particular interested in the impact of the rate of contribution tp on the 
growth rate. Higher pension premiums tp lead to lower values of f and higher values of d. 
(The interpretation of f is savings of wage income after taxes and pension premiums per 
unit of capital.) Higher values of d lead to a lower value of the slope and of the intercept 
and therefore to lower growth rates. Lower values of f go in the same direction. Higher 
premiums therefore reduce the private assets to efficient capital ratio, A/K*. According to 
equation (18’) capital growth is above a + n to the extent that A/K* is growing. Therefore 
capital also has a growth rate that is falling with tp.  
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Appendix 4  Estimation results for section 5 
 
First and second lags of first-differenced variables of the vector-error-correction model 
(t-values in brackets)  
  
Equation (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39)
Variables
Indep.\dep. D(LNGDPPC)D(LOG(I/Y)) D(LOG(L/P)) D(U) D(LOG(W)) D(NMP)
D(LNGDPPC‐1) ‐0.452073 0.019547 ‐0.335577 22.11674 ‐0.712145 ‐0.013503
[‐0.97909] [ 0.03084] [‐1.30302] [ 2.09569] [‐1.65513] [‐0.46714]
D(LNGDPPC‐2) ‐0.235111 0.577541 0.075202 4.249184 ‐0.589942 ‐0.013713
[‐0.74270] [ 1.32895] [ 0.42591] [ 0.58728] [‐1.99988] [‐0.69196]
D(LOG(I/Y)‐1) ‐0.482689 ‐0.684197 ‐0.150132 5.940609 0.15168 ‐9.27E‐03
[‐2.79059] [‐2.88132] [‐1.55613] [ 1.50263] [ 0.94104] [‐0.85646]
D(LOG(I/Y)‐2) ‐0.144334 ‐0.135353 0.044517 ‐2.84233 0.097732 0.000531
[‐1.08621] [‐0.74198] [ 0.60065] [‐0.93586] [ 0.78928] [ 0.06384]
D(LOG(L/P)‐1) 0.1176 1.493333 0.640141 ‐31.08595 0.476419 0.013915
[ 0.22417] [ 2.07347] [ 2.18767] [‐2.59249] [ 0.97454] [ 0.42368]
D(LOG(L/P)‐2) ‐1.419593 ‐0.849959 ‐0.584379 27.75422 0.392533 0.042969
[‐2.71481] [‐1.18401] [‐2.00362] [ 2.32219] [ 0.80557] [ 1.31264]
D(U‐1) ‐0.034419 ‐0.04171 ‐0.01044 0.533122 ‐0.000217 0.000311
[‐3.01370] [‐2.66023] [‐1.63884] [ 2.04228] [‐0.02039] [ 0.43429]
D(U‐2) ‐0.01084 ‐0.02657 0.00139 ‐0.092754 ‐0.001974 ‐2.69E‐05
[‐1.20090] [‐2.14415] [ 0.27600] [‐0.44957] [‐0.23465] [‐0.04756]
D(LOG(W‐1)) 0.048674 0.424975 0.071961 ‐4.475284 0.333039 0.016525
[ 0.25006] [ 1.59035] [ 0.66281] [‐1.00591] [ 1.83608] [ 1.35616]
D(LOG(W‐2)) 0.427066 0.90451 0.289818 ‐15.85621 0.045598 ‐0.000679
[ 2.00025] [ 3.08592] [ 2.43367] [‐3.24924] [ 0.22919] [‐0.05076]
D(NMP‐1) ‐2.397839 ‐11.52248 ‐1.4928 ‐139.6183 1.79137 0.522292
[‐0.58667] [‐2.05353] [‐0.65482] [‐1.49454] [ 0.47034] [ 2.04126]
D(NMP‐2) ‐6.316793 ‐5.390569 ‐1.288568 21.44815 ‐2.004672 0.175093
[‐1.62345] [‐1.00916] [‐0.59374] [ 0.24117] [‐0.55289] [ 0.71882]
C 0.016944 ‐0.048369 ‐0.003578 ‐0.070781 0.039759 0.000321
[ 1.36349] [‐2.83531] [‐0.51624] [‐0.24921] [ 3.43346] [ 0.41264]
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The details for the regression underlying Figure 8 are as follows. 
  
Dependent Variable: log(L/P). Method: Least Squares. Period: 1973-2009. HAC standard errors & 
covariance (Bartlett kernel, Andrews bandwidth = 0.8746)      
  
Variable   Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
      
C   -1.411231  0.344680 -4.094324 0.0004 
LOG(L(-1)/P(-1)) 0.809340  0.060230 13.43750 0.0000 
D(LOG(IY(-1)))  0.109717  0.051083 2.147826 0.0416 
D(LOG(IY(-2)))  0.201977  0.044276 4.561820 0.0001 
LNGDPPC(-1)  0.084866  0.018631 4.555228 0.0001 
D(LNGDPPC(-2)) 0.210145  0.133543 1.573618 0.1281 
LOG(IY(-1))  0.146983  0.054929 2.675857 0.0130 
D(LOG(L(-2)/P(-2))) -0.765533  0.202438 -3.781568 0.0009 
PDL01   1.342988  0.698558 1.922515 0.0660 
PDL02   -0.275587  0.240278 -1.146951 0.2623 
PDL03   -0.071817  0.061504 -1.167675 0.2540 
PDL04   0.006301  0.013445 0.468690 0.6434 
      
Adjusted R-squared: 0.97. Durbin-Watson stat: 1.73. 
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